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Collegiality and communications are essential and related
components of appellate court infrastructure. Technological
progress in communications, however, does not necessarily
promote collegiality. Some innovations may benefit
communications with speed or cost containment, but they do not
necessarily advance the quality of communication and can even
generate friction with collegiality. By way of example, this
essay focuses on two technological advances to which appellate
courts are now adapting: teleconferencing and electronic mail.
Before probing this tension between technology and collegiality,
however, it is necessary to first reflect upon the nature, sources,
and benefits of collegiality on an appellate court.
II. APPELLATE COLLEGIALITY
The very nature of an appellate court, a collection of judges
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. My
law clerk, Ida Bostian, provided invaluable assistance in preparing this paper.
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jointly resolving individual cases and controversies, suggests the
need for collegiality. The product of a collegial court, its
opinions, are "better in substance, style, and tone" than those of
a court which expends little effort to harmonize diverse views.'
Thus, a collegial court better manifests the bedrock principle
upon which appellate courts rest: multiple minds are better than
2one.
On the other hand, many of the very qualities which
distinguish an appellate court correspondingly create tension
with collegiality. For example, groups of judges on a single
court usually have been appointed by presidents or governors
from different political parties or elected by different
constituencies; most of the judges are strong-willed,
intellectually capable, and products of an adversary system; and
the judges tend to be of diverse backgrounds, cultures, and
expertise. Additionally, unlike the parties in a partnership or a
marriage, an appellate judge does not choose her colleagues.4
The tension with collegiality flowing from the very
composition of a court ensures that collegiality is neither a
romanticized notion resulting in institutional bliss nor a
brutalized concept sacrificing independence and individuality to
a collective persona. One practitioner of the art of appellate
collegiality for some thirty-five years, Judge Frank Coffin,5
described collegiality as:
[t]he deliberately cultivated attitude among judges of equal
status and sometimes widely differing views
working in intimate, continuing, open, and noncompetitive
relationship with each other,
1. Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal: Courts, Lawyering, and Judging 228 (W.W. Norton
1994); see generally Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C.
Circuit, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1335, 1361 (1998) (discussing the benefits of ideologically diverse
judges sharing their views with one another); Patricia M. Wald, Collegiality on a Court: Its
Practices, Problems, and Pitfalls, 40 Fed. B. News & J. 521, 528 (1993) (discussing the
effects of collegiality, or the lack thereof, on the appellate decisionmaking process).
2. See Coffin, supra n. 1, at 220.
3. See id.; see also Wald, supra n. 1, at 522; Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on
Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great
Books, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 906-07 (1987).
4. See Wald, supra n. 1, at 522; see also Rudolph J. Gerber, Collegiality on the Court
of Appeals, 32 Ariz. Atty. 19, 19 (1995).
5. Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
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which manifests respect for the strengths of the others,
restrains one's pride of authorship, while respecting one's
own deepest convictions,
values patience in understanding and compromise in
nonessentials,
and seeks as much excellence in the court's decision as the
combined talents, experience, insight, and energy of the
judges permit.
6
Judge Coffin's description of appellate collegiality would
seemingly portray an adherent as Christ-like. That, however, is
merely the result of the aspirational nature of collegiality. No
court or judge is always collegial. Collegiality is not "instinctive
or natural" to judges serendipitously comprising an appellate
court.7 Collegiality needs attention, exercise, and development.
It is a dynamic, not static, state. Because it is so fragile and
delicate, anything which might affect collegiality need be
viewed with caution. That is particularly so when the subject
matter is tools of communication, the daily bread of an appellate
judge.
III. ORAL ARGUMENT AND TELECONFERENCING
In the interests of convenience and cost control, appellate
courts are beginning to adopt teleconferencing technology for
oral argument. Among the federal circuits, the Second, Third,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits' are now using this technology for
selected cases. 9 In the Tenth Circuit, counsel present their
arguments from remote locations' ° to the panel sitting together in
Denver." The Tenth Circuit, along with the Third and Ninth
6. Coffin, supra n. 1, at 215.
7. Frank M. Coffin, The Anatomy of Judicial Collegiality, in Appellate Courts:
Structures, Functions, Processes, and Personnel 551 (Daniel J. Meador et al. eds., Michie
1994).
8. A description of the early use of video conferencing for oral argument in the Tenth
Circuit appears at Gary H. Wente, Courtroom Videoconferencing Comes of Age: A Report
from the Tenth Circuit, 38 Judges' J. 28 (1999).
9. At this writing, the Fourth Circuit is planning to use teleconferencing.
10. The remote locations are limited to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Cheyenne,
Wyoming; Topeka and Kansas City, Kansas; and Albuquerque, New Mexico.
1I. The judges convene in Denver for regular terms of court to hear oral argument by
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Circuits,'2 also has the capability to allow judges to be in the
remote locations. It is thus not necessary for the panel to be
together in the same location.
Only in exceptional circumstances, however, do the judges
of the Tenth Circuit not convene in a single location to hear
arguments. In the two years since the Tenth Circuit began
hearing arguments by video, there have been but two instances
when all three judges have not been together. On those
occasions, emergencies and health concerns caused a judge to
participate in the argument from a remote location.
I participated in one such instance. After concluding the
arguments, the panel teleconferenced in private to discuss the
cases. At the conclusion of our conference, it was an eerie
feeling to bid our colleague farewell, turn off the monitor, and
go to lunch-two of us. Because conducting an oral argument
with one judge remote from the others was and remains the clear
exception in the Tenth Circuit, the incident was remarkable only
from a technological perspective.
Some have suggested, however, that the teleconferencing
technology will and should be regularly used with judges remote
from one another participating as a panel at oral arguments.
3
While the availability of teleconferencing for oral argument
makes sense as a cost-containment tool, its regular or frequent
use for oral argument with judges remote from one another
jeopardizes collegiality. 4 The danger is accentuated because,
although direct travel cost savings are measurable, the
accompanying cost to collegiality on an appellate court is real
but not economically measurable.
Collegiality requires a familiarity with other judges, which
traditional means. Since January 1998, one or two panels (of some twenty total panels
during a term) will hear a series of four to six cases by video.
12. Telephone Interview by Ida Bostian with Kara Ferber, Circuit Executive's Office,
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Mar. 27, 2000); Telephone Interview
by Ida Bostian with Jim Hochstadt, Court of Appeals Clerk's Office, United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Mar. 22, 2000).
13. See e.g. Commission on the Future of the California Courts, Justice in the Balance
2020 (1994), reprinted in Excerpts from Justice in the Balance 2020, 45 Hastings L.J. 605,
609 (1994); J. Clark Kelso, Report on the California Appellate System, 45 Hastings L.J.
433, 484-85 (1994) (advocating teleconferencing but warning of its potential threat to
collegiality).
14. See Deanell Reece Tacha, The Federal Courts in the 21st Century, 2 Chapman L.
Rev. 7, 19 (1999).
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occurs only with regular face-to-face contact. 5 When a court
convenes for oral arguments, that contact does not generally end
when the cases are submitted and the judges have concluded
their conferences. Judges frequently dine together and otherwise
socialize when they are gathered for terms of court. 16 The loss of
this contact, resulting from regular or frequent use of
teleconferencing with judges remote from one another, would be
at a much higher cost to an appellate court than any possible
savings in travel costs. On an appellate court, absence does not
make the heart grow fonder, and familiarity does not breed
contempt. Absence makes the heart unfamiliar, and it does not
breed collegiality.
IV. ELECTRONIC MAIL
In many ways, courts differ little from other organizations
in their small group dynamics and interpersonal relations. 7 As
with other organizations, the use of e-mail is not the dawn of
rudeness and incivility among judges. If not properly perceived,
understood, and utilized, however, e-mail can exacerbate the
inherent stresses on collegiality in an appellate court.
Because e-mail is a relatively new tool, judges frequently
assume it works the same as more traditional means of
communication, the spoken and written word. Experience and
reflection, however, teach that by allowing instantaneous,
spontaneous, and written communication without a face-to-face
or oral encounter, e-mail differs from the written memorandum,
the telephone call, and the personal conversation. The phone and
personal conversation are more forgiving, as they allow for
voice inflection and immediate defusing of misinterpreted
remarks and do not produce a written record.
For example, a rhetorical question in the spoken word may
15. Cf Coffin, supra n. 1, at 216.
16. See Harrison M. Winter, Goodwill and Dedication, in The Federal Appellate
Judiciary in the 21st Century 167-70 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., Fed.
Jud. Ctr. 1989); Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 Ohio St. L.J.
585, 588, 591 (1995); cf Wald, supra n. 1, at 527.
17. See Walter F. Murphy, Courts as Small Groups, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1565 (1966)
(explaining ways in which small group analysis is and is not applicable to appellate courts);
but see Gerber, supra n. 4, at 20 (stating that unlike the situation in small group dynamics,
unanimity within an appellate court may muddle nuances of difficult, multi-faceted issues).
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appear to be substantive when communicated by e-mail. Upon
the receipt of a problematic proposed opinion, a telephone
request for the record from a possible dissenter may well be
perceived differently than a cold, terse message delivered by e-
mail reading: "Send me the record." Additionally, because e-
mail, albeit written, is perhaps perceived as essentially a
substitute for, if not interchangeable with, oral conversation, it is
often not used with the same thoughtful reflection as a more
traditional written memorandum. With a click of the mouse,
intentionally or otherwise, a spontaneous, instantaneous message
can appear on the screen of a judge and possibly the screens of
all the judges. A recipient is armed with the same tool for a
spontaneous, instantaneous, written response.
While the use of e-mail without reflection and care can be
hazardous to collegiality, the benefits of e-mail are so
monumental 8 that the risk to collegiality must be undertaken.
When the servers malfunction for any significant period in the
Tenth Circuit and the court is unable to instantaneously
communicate in writing throughout the six-state jurisdiction, an
important tool is lost. 9 Thus, to preserve collegiality along with
the benefits of instantaneous, written communication, the judges
must utilize e-mail with a sensitivity to its potential risk to
collegiality and must author thoughtful, reflective messages.
V. CONCLUSION
Challenging the wholesale, uncritical acceptance of
technology is not without risk of being perceived as merely
resistant to change and innovation. The misgivings expressed in
this paper, however, are not directed at technological advances
18. See Stephen L. Wasby, Communication in the Ninth Circuit: A Concern for
Collegiality, I I U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 73, 103 (1987) (noting both the benefits of e-mail
and the danger it poses to collegiality).
19. The telephone is not a satisfactory substitute for e-mail because it interrupts a judge
at a time when she "is not likely to be thinking about the case in which the caller is
interested." Stephen L. Wasby, Technology and Communication in a Federal Court: The
Ninth Circuit, 28 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (1988). "The calling judge perhaps may
benefit.., by obtaining some immediate feedback, but the cost of immediacy may be
diminished quality" in the responding judge's analysis of the issue at hand. Id. at 13. In
contrast, e-mail does not interrupt the recipient and allows that judge to collect her thoughts
for a more reflective response.
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per se. Nor are they intended as obstacles to the adoption of
inventive ways to communicate. They are intended only as a
caveat to the manner in which appellate courts use and apply
new tools.
Teleconferencing is useful and cost-effective both generally
and in its application to oral argument. It should not, however,
be a substitute for the regular convocation of an appellate court.
Additionally, electronic mail should be used with the same care
and reflection as "snail mail." Teleconferencing and e-mail are
but mere examples of meaningful advances in communication
which should be adopted and applied sensitive to the fragile,
collegial underpinnings of an effective appellate court. Judge
Coffin is, again, instructive: "IT]he paradox of collegiality
among independent peers is eminently worth thinking about,
planning for, and struggling to maintain." 
20
20. Coffin, supra n. 1, at 229.

